The forthcoming review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) convenes at a flashpoint for the global nuclear order. Once known as the bedrock of international security, the treaty is buckling under the weight of geopolitical rivalries and rapid technological shifts. With the world’s total nuclear inventory hovering around 12,100 warheads, expectations that this conference can halt a budding arms race must be tempered. Its realistic function is not a grand breakthrough, but rather damage control, slowing the deterioration of a fragile global baseline.
The most immediate threat is the collapse of bilateral arms control between the United States and Russia, who together possess nearly 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. Decades of strategic stability built on negotiated limits, transparency, and verification are fraying. As existing treaties near expiry with zero momentum toward replacement frameworks, the world faces a dangerous novelty: the two nuclear superpowers operating without any mutual constraints. This isn’t just a race for numbers; it is a qualitative competition to build hypersonic delivery systems, stealthier submarines, and diverse tactical payloads that compress a leader’s decision-making window to mere minutes.
This trajectory shatters the fundamental, reciprocal bargain of the NPT. Under this landmark 1970 agreement, 186 non-nuclear-weapon states renounced the pursuit of atomic weapons in exchange for a binding commitment from the five recognised nuclear powers — the US, Russia, China, the UK, and France — to pursue disarmament in good faith. As these five recognised nuclear powers, alongside other nuclear-armed states, aggressively modernise their arsenals instead of dismantling them, the frustration of non-nuclear states deepens. This hypocrisy threatens to break the NPT’s legitimacy from within.
Compounding this tension is the shift from a predictable, Cold War-style bipolar stand-off to a chaotic, multipolar landscape. China is rapidly expanding its strategic footprint, with the Pentagon estimating its arsenal could swell to 1,500 warheads by 2035. This dramatic expansion reshapes strategic calculus, turning bilateral deterrence into a complex, multi-sided equation. Meanwhile, regional flashpoints in East Asia and the Middle East keep incentives for nuclear deterrence perilously high.
Emerging technologies add a layer of digital volatility. Hypersonic missiles flying at over five times the speed of sound, artificial intelligence integrated into early-warning networks, and advanced cyber capabilities threaten the sacred cow of nuclear strategy: a guaranteed second-strike capability. A cyberattack targeting a nation’s command-and-control systems could blind a state’s defences, creating a “use them or lose them” dilemma that incentivises a pre-emptive strike during a crisis.
This uncertainty triggers a domino effect in extended deterrence. Countries like Japan and South Korea, which rely on the US “nuclear umbrella” for safety, are watching these shifting dynamics closely. If trust in those American security guarantees wavers, domestic political pressure for indigenous nuclear weapons programmes will inevitably spike. Even single-digit proliferation would radically increase the mathematical odds of a catastrophic miscalculation.
Given these deep geopolitical fractures, the upcoming conference will almost certainly fail to produce binding new disarmament treaties. However, dismissing the process entirely is a mistake. The NPT remains the only universal forum where the world’s nuclear rivals are forced to sit at the same table. In an era where consensus is nearly impossible, simply maintaining this channel for engagement is a crucial act of risk management.
Ultimately, the NPT review conference cannot magically freeze the structural drivers of a renewed arms race. Strategic rivalry and technological innovation are forces too large for a single diplomatic forum to contain. Progress requires a conservative definition of success. Preventing further erosion, establishing basic transparency measures, and keeping communication lines open under current conditions would be a major victory. The NPT has survived for over half a century because of its adaptability; preserving this imperfect mechanism of restraint is our best shot at avoiding unconstrained nuclear competition.
